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Abstract 
In Germany, targeted wage subsidies to employers are an important instrument of 
active labor market policy. This paper utilizes process generated data of the Ger-
man Public Employment Service to compare the wages of individuals taking up a 
subsidized job with those of otherwise similar individuals who found an unsubsidized 
job. The results indicate that subsidized jobs are not associated with gains or losses 
regarding daily wages, which might be contributed to wage setting within the Ger-
man system of industrial relations. Nonetheless, because subsequent employment 
rates of subsidized persons are higher on average, we find a positive relationship 
between cumulated wages and subsidization. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Eingliederungszuschüsse sind zeitlich befristete Lohnkostenzuschüsse, die Arbeit-
geber bei der Einstellung von Personen mit eingeschränkter Vermittelbarkeit erhal-
ten können. In Deutschland sind sie ein wichtiges Instrument der aktiven Arbeits-
marktpolitik. Dieser Beitrag nutzt Prozessdaten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, um 
die Arbeitsentgelte von Personen, die mit einem solchen Eingliederungszuschuss 
gefördert wurden, mit denen ähnlicher, aber ungefördert eingestellter Personen zu 
vergleichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass geförderte Beschäftigungsverhältnisse im 
Mittel weder mit höheren noch mit geringeren Tagesentgelten einhergehen. Da ge-
förderte Personen jedoch in der Folgezeit mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit beschäf-
tigt sind als vergleichbare ungeförderte Personen, fallen ihre kumulierten Arbeits-
entgelte über einen längeren Zeitraum betrachtet höher aus. 
 
JEL classification: J31, J38, J58 
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1 Introduction 
Targeted wage subsidies are tailored to particular groups of unemployed persons 
and typically granted for a limited period of time. They temporarily reduce a firm’s 
labor costs for hiring and employing previously unemployed persons and can thus 
trigger the placement of such persons into jobs. To motivate a firm to hire a particu-
lar unemployed person for a particular job, a period of subsidization might prove 
necessary for several reasons: First, a worker’s skills might not match the require-
ments of a job, but the mismatch is expected to diminish with training on the job. 
Second, a period of subsidization reduces an employer’s uncertainty – which might 
be particularly high for previously long-term unemployed persons – about the job 
applicant’s productivity and thus serves as a screening instrument. Third, institu-
tional factors such as minimum wages or collectively negotiated wages might drive a 
wedge between individual productivity and wages. Of course, the longer term effects 
of the subsidy depend on the issue whether the gap between the offered and the 
accepted wage of a worker can be closed during the subsidization period. 
In Germany, targeted wage subsidies paid to employers are an important instrument 
of active labor market policy: During 2003, more than 180,000 subsidized jobs were 
taken up. While the number of entries into the program decreased to 134,000 in 
2005, afterwards they increased again, up to around 250,000 in 2007 and 2008. 
Transitions into subsidized jobs accounted for roughly 3 percent of all transitions out 
of unemployment in Germany during 2004 (Rothe 2007). Within our sample of me-
dium-aged unemployed persons entering employment during the second quarter of 
2003, as much as 6 percent of all transitions out of unemployment into employment 
were subsidized. 
Our study presents first results on wage rates paid in subsidized jobs in Germany. In 
particular, we ask whether workers taking up a subsidized job during the second 
quarter of 2003 experienced wage gains or wage losses compared to otherwise 
similar, but unsubsidized workers. This question is of political importance, because 
wage subsidies are intended to compensate employers for a temporarily reduced 
productivity of subsidized workers. Thus, if we observe wage gains of subsidized 
workers this could be a hint on unintended side effects of the program. No explicit 
upper or lower bounds on wages are prescribed by law, but might be provided at the 
local level. 
To compare wages in subsidized and unsubsidized jobs, we combine propensity 
score matching with a difference-in-differences strategy. We have no information 
whether subsidies were really required to induce a firm to hire and subsequently 
employ a subsidized worker at the observed wage rate, thus we cannot interpret our 
results in a causal way. Nonetheless, we obtain several interesting and new results: 
We show for our full sample that subsidized workers in Germany receive daily 
wages that are not significantly different from those of similar unsubsidized workers. 
However, taking into account that the subsequent employment rates of participants 
are higher, we find significant higher cumulated wages of subsidized workers during 
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our observation period of 3.5 years. If we restrict our analysis to a sample of firms 
hiring subsidized as well as unsubsidized workers, we obtain again mostly insignifi-
cant differences across subsidized and similar unsubsidized workers and higher 
subsequent employment rates of subsidized workers.  
We interpret our findings mainly in the light of the German system of industrial rela-
tions: In Germany, collective contracts (still) play an important role for wage setting, 
and wages are usually attached to jobs rather than to individual workers. This im-
plies that lower or higher wages for subsidized workers within similar jobs compared 
to unsubsidized workers might be perceived as unfair and not acceptable by work-
ers and firms as well as by caseworkers of the Public Employment Service. Fur-
thermore, wage undercutting might be infeasible, because subsidized jobs are on 
average rather low-wage jobs. However, these results do not rule out that a wide-
spread use of wage subsidies for unemployed persons – as we observe in particular 
in East Germany – increases individual reservation wages and thus prolongs indi-
vidual unemployment duration. 
In the following, Section 2 discusses the relationship between wages and wage sub-
sidies. Section 3 provides details on the program analyzed as well as on the data 
set, while Section 4 describes the econometric strategy. Section 5 presents the em-
pirical results; Section 6 summarizes and draws some conclusions. 
2 Wage subsidies and wages 
In the following, we will first summarize findings from empirical studies. Because the 
effect of subsidies on cumulated earnings hinges on employment rates, we will also 
briefly discuss studies focusing on employment outcomes. Second, we sketch theo-
retical approaches analyzing the impact of subsidies on wages and employment. 
Third, we will briefly describe the institutional background for wage-setting in Ger-
many and its implications. 
Empirical evidence on the wage effects of targeted wage subsidies is rather sparse. 
In Sweden, temporarily subsidized jobs offer an opportunity to acquire job-specific 
human capital; the decision to join a program is made jointly by the unemployed 
person and his or her caseworker. Adda et al. (2007) presented descriptive evi-
dence for a sample of young workers that those subsidized earned 3.5 percent more 
than other previously unemployed workers. However, these results do not account 
for the dynamic selection process into programs. They then developed and cali-
brated a structural model, which showed that subsidized jobs increased earnings 
very moderately and by less than half the amount that participation in a regular job 
did. They speculated that subsidized work may contribute less to human capital 
formation than regular work. Furthermore, the opportunity of program participation 
might have raised the reservation wage for the treated and have delayed their en-
trance into employment. 
For the State of Wisconsin, Hamersma (2005) analyzed the “Work Opportunity Tax 
Credit” and the “Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit”. The subsidy applies to members of 
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certain disadvantaged groups and long-time welfare recipients, respectively. For 
both programs, employers have to apply in writing at the State Employment Security 
Agency and – if eligibility of applicants or new hires has been certified – claim the 
time limited subsidy that covers a share of the wage costs on their federal tax return. 
Hamersma estimated the effect of these subsidies on wages and tenure of subsi-
dized workers, using propensity score matching to select a comparison group of 
eligible, but not certified workers. As a result, she found significantly positive effects 
on wages in subsidized jobs – around 40 percent of the tax credit was passed 
through to workers in the form of a wage premium. Effects of participation in a sub-
sidized job on tenure were insignificant, however. In a companion paper, Hamersma 
(2006) showed that showed that those firms where a larger fraction of workers 
reached certain job-duration thresholds were more likely to apply for a tax credit. 
A very different result had been obtained in an earlier study for the State of Illinois, 
where the selection process into the program differed: Dubin & Rivers (1993) pre-
sented results from an experiment where randomly selected unemployed persons 
had the opportunity to place a subsidy voucher. They found that wages were highest 
for unemployed that refused to participate, followed by the control group; wages 
were lowest for those who actually used the voucher. They explain this result by 
self-selection of experimental participants – subsidies were typically refused by 
high-wage earners, who were reluctant to identify themselves as beneficiaries of the 
government. In a recent study, Brouillette & Lacroix (2008) obtained similar conclu-
sions. They analyzed the Canadian “Self Sufficiency Project”, where previously ran-
domly selected unemployed persons, who then became eligible (after 12 months of 
unemployment) and qualified (through taking up a full-time job within 12 months 
after establishing eligibility), received a generous in-work benefit. They showed that 
participating treatment group members earned less than control group members – 
but only some of those who were assigned to the treatment group actually partici-
pated in the program: In particular, individuals with a low expected wage rate had an 
incentive to participate in the income supplement scheme, assuming they received 
an offer, whereas those with high expected income did not participate. 
Similar to the effect of subsidies on wages, rather few studies concentrate on the 
effect on subsidies on tenure. For West Germany, Ruppe (2009) found that subsi-
dies decreased the risk of ending an employment relationship considerably, result-
ing in higher survival rates and longer tenure of previously subsidized employment 
relationships. Some studies applying duration models focus on the Belgium labor 
market: Cockx et al. (1998) conducted comparisons of subsidized and non-subsi-
dized individuals taking up a job, utilizing data from firms on their last five recruit-
ments. They found positive, but insignificant effects of the subsidy on job tenure. 
Göbel (2006, 2007) analyzed the effects of subsidized employment on labor market 
transitions of young long-term unemployed workers. His main result was that partici-
pation in subsidized employment had a positive effect on the duration of the first 
employment spell, in particular during the first year of participation. 
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A large number of studies, however, have estimated the impact of targeted wage 
subsidies on the employment prospects of participants, compared to unemployed 
non-participants. Most authors constructed comparison groups of similar, but non-
treated individuals using statistical matching techniques and non-experimental data. 
For Germany, Jaenichen (2002, 2005) and Jaenichen & Stephan (2009) used this 
approach and showed that participants in different kinds of targeted wage subsidies 
schemes had much higher subsequent employment rates than similar unemployed 
persons, who did not take up a subsidized job. Likewise, evidence for Britain (Dor-
sett 2006) and Sweden (Sianesi 2008, Carling & Richardson 2004, Fredriksson & 
Johansson 2004, Forslund et al. 2004) suggested that wage subsidies had a posi-
tive effect on employment probabilities of the participants. Turning to the few results 
from social experiments on subsidy vouchers, Burtless (1985) found that unem-
ployed persons with a voucher were less likely to find employment than job-seekers 
without vouchers. However, Dubin & Rivers (1993) obtained an increased probability 
of reemployment for the treated groups, when taking into account self-selection into 
voucher usage. Boockmann et al. (2007) investigated the effects of changes in the 
legislation regarding German wage subsidies and concluded that increases in sub-
sidized employment were mostly absorbed by deadweight losses. 
Wage subsidies are incorporated into a variety of theoretical models. In simple static 
models, a hiring subsidy is treated as a cost reduction of labor (Bell et al. 1999). If 
subsidies lower the total factor costs and these are not passed on to consumers 
through a reduction of prices, the subsidy shifts the labor demand curve upwards. 
Employment as well as the wage rate increases, while the size of the effects de-
pends on the elasticity of labor demand and supply. In case of a binding minimum 
wage, a wage subsidy might induce firms to hire more workers just at the threshold, 
without actually increasing wages. However, targeted wage subsidies only reduce 
the relative costs of particular workers, thus they should at the same time incur a 
substitution for relatively more expensive factors of production (as other workers and 
capital). Furthermore, some of those subsidized might have been recruited anyway 
at the same wage, inducing deadweight losses. 
Calmfors (1994) highlighted also that the labor supply or wage setting curve, re-
spectively, can shift upwards as well, if wage subsidies are quantitatively important 
enough to lessen labor market pressure. Adda et al. (2007) draw attention to the 
fact that the availability of wage subsidies might have an impact on the behaviour of 
unemployed persons. A widespread use of subsidies might decrease the incentive 
to accept an offer for a lower paid unsubsidized job and increase an individual’s 
reservation wage, thus prolonging individual unemployment duration. 
Recent theoretical literature on wage subsides is mostly based on search or match-
ing theories (Mortensen & Pissarides 1994). Within this branch of the literature, an 
important distinction has to be made between general wage subsidies – paid to all 
low-wage workers – and targeted wage subsidies or hiring subsidies that are tai-
lored to particular groups of unemployed persons. In addition to developing their 
own models, Brown et al. (2006) as well as Jahn & Wagner (2008) summarize the 
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comprehensive literature in this field. An important feature of most studies is that 
wages are the result of a Nash bargain and that part of the subsidy is handed over 
to workers through rent sharing. For instance, Hamersma (2005) formulated a 
search model with a minimum wage, targeted wage subsidies (paid for an unlimited 
time period) and uncertainty on the productivity of a worker-firm match. Her main 
result is that employment is higher for subsidized workers and their wages increase 
above the minimum wage even at lower levels of productivity than for unsubsidized 
workers. Thus, subsidized workers receive higher wages than unsubsidized workers 
of the same ability. The effect of the subsidy on tenure remains ambiguous, how-
ever. On the one hand, subsidized workers are less productive; on the other hand, 
the subsidy decreases the risk of ending the employment relationship. Cahuc & Zyl-
berberg (2004, Chap. 11) analyzed general wage subsidies, paid permanently for all 
low-wage earners in an economy, regardless of their employment history, within a 
matching theory framework. An important finding of their study is that the efficiency 
of the subsidy depends crucially on features of the system of unemployment com-
pensation. Mortensen & Pissarides (2003) draw attention to the fact that, in a dy-
namic setting, hiring subsidies could also encourage firms to terminate jobs sooner 
to take advantage of the subsidy from new job creation. 
Given that search and matching models usually assume that wages result from a 
Nash bargain, most models predict that workers might participate in rents generated 
by wage subsidies. In Germany, the institutional setting should also play a major 
role in determining wages of subsidized workers: Legislation prescribes that the 
collectively negotiated or local customary wage level cannot be exceeded when de-
termining the size of the subsidy. While no explicit upper or lower bound is provided 
by law, subsidies may be refused by caseworkers, if they undercut the collectively 
negotiated or local customary wage level (see Section 3 for further details). 
Dustmann et al. (2009) analyzed recent changes in the West German wage struc-
ture during the 80s and 90s. The authors argue that the decline in unionization Ger-
many experienced in the 90s is responsible for a rise in lower tail inequality of 
wages over that period. Nonetheless, during 2007 still around 80 percent of workers 
in the private sector were employed in firms at least applying collectively negotiated 
contracts in West Germany, while 62 percent were so employed in East Germany 
(Kohaut & Ellguth 2008). Unions try to standardize and compress wages between as 
well as within firms, in particular by attaching wages to job-grades: Wage compres-
sion strengthens the organizational unity among workers with different skills and 
tasks up to a certain degree (Freeman & Medoff 1984); and union members might 
have preferences for wage compression, if the mean exceeds the median wage or if 
they are risk-averse and uncertain about the future development of their wages 
(Agell 1999, 2002). Importantly, German firms applying collective contracts usually 
do not differentiate between workers with and without union membership (although 
they are not obliged to pay union wages to non-union members). Furthermore, be-
cause collective wage contracts are much more important in Germany than in North 
America, they constitute reference wages which might be perceived as fair by many 
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workers and might invigorate workers’ sense of entitlement (Holden 1994, Gerlach 
et al. 2008). Franz & Pfeiffer (2003) surveyed managers from about 800 firms and 
found that wage rigidities in German labor markets for less qualified workers seem 
to arise mainly due to collective contracts, whereas rigidities for highly skilled work-
ers are rather the result of efficiency wage considerations. To conclude, the ubiquity 
of collective contracts implies that lower or higher wages for subsidized workers 
than for unsubsidized workers within similar jobs might also be supposed to be less 
acceptable in Germany than for instance in North America – by workers and firms as 
well as by caseworkers. 
3 Program features and data set 
Our study analyzes two variants of a wage subsidy program to employers – called 
“Eingliederungszuschuss“ – that were in place in Germany during the period 1998 to 
2003. The first variant was characterized by a rather low level of targeting, compen-
sating for special training requirements, while the second variant was aimed at hard-
to-place unemployed with severe problems of reintegration. The subsidy for training 
requirements could be granted for up to 30 percent of monthly wages for up to 6 
months, while the subsidy for hard-to-place persons could regularly account for as 
much as 50 percent of the monthly salary and continue for at most 12 months (these 
limits could be exceeded in exceptional cases). If a subsidized person had been 
dismissed within a follow-up period (usually of the same length as the duration of 
the subsidization) for reasons attributable to the employer, the employer could be 
asked to reimburse part of the subsidy. A subsidy could not be granted if the worker 
had previously been regularly employed at the firm applying for the subsidy during 
the last four years, or if another employee had been dismissed to hire a subsidized 
worker instead. 
Contrary to much of the US experience, wage subsidies in Germany were not 
granted through vouchers during the time period under consideration. Instead, case-
workers in local employment agencies had latitude in the allowance decision as well 
as in the fixing of the amount and duration of the subsidy. Most often, employers 
took the initiative and negotiated with the local labor market office over a subsidy to 
be granted, if hiring a particular unemployed worker (ZEW et al. 2006, p. 53 ff.). 
However, caseworkers also might have offered a subsidy for particular worker-job-
matches, if a firm had asked the local labor market office for applicants. Further-
more, caseworkers might also have promised unemployed persons to grant a sub-
sidy, if they obtain a job offer, to be used as an instrument of self-marketing during 
job-search. In any of these constellations, the decision to support an unemployed 
person with a wage subsidy had to be reasoned in each individual case; size and 
duration should be determined by productivity deficits of the worker in the particular 
job.  
In fixing the amount of the subsidy, the law prescribes that only wages up to the 
collectively negotiated or the local customary level, respectively, and up to social 
security thresholds could be taken into account. Wages as such might be lower or 
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higher from a legal perspective. But informally, a lower bound for subsidized wages 
seem to exist also: ZEW et al (2006, p. 55) reported from caseworker interviews that 
wage rates undercutting the local customary level by 20 percent or more are given 
as reasons to refuse the subsidy. Our own small-scale enquiries in the Public Em-
ployment Service showed that – while no written instructions are available – there 
seems to be a consensus that subsidies should not support wage dumping and that 
the subsidized wages should not be below the local customary wage level. 
Hartmann (2004) conducted a comprehensive study of the importance of a wide 
range of wage subsidy variants for firms and their hiring behavior. Case studies of 
firms showed that firms often utilize subsidies to improve their competitiveness. On 
the other hand, flexibility requirements deterred firms from using subsidies and led 
them to hire marginal or part-time employees instead. Another point against wage 
subsidies occurred if firms could not predict labor demand in the longer run (p. 51 
f.). Based on a firm survey related to 3500 subsidized hires, Hartmann also tried to 
estimate the amount of deadweight losses by asking firms if they would have hired 
the same person without the support of a subsidy. For the programs under consid-
eration in our study, firms answered that around 40 to 60 percent of subsidized per-
sons would have been hired also without the help of the subsidy (p. 93). From 
these, around 20 to 30 percentage points would have been recruited anyway and 
have at the same time been suggested for the job by the caseworker. Generally, 
deadweight losses are smaller for workers with more severe obstacles to reintegra-
tion. Furthermore, firms revealed that the main integration problem of hard-to-place 
workers were not individual productivity deficits as such, but rather that firms as-
cribed productivity deficits to applicants that had been long-term unemployment or 
had little labor market experience (Hartmann, p. 147). In fact, the original assess-
ment of productivity deficits had to be revised in a considerable number of cases 
(pp. 198). These results are in line with findings of the implementation study from a 
survey of 34 firms, presented in ZEW et al. (2005, p. 140 ff.). 28 of 34 firms an-
swered that hiring decisions did not depend critically on subsidization opportunities. 
Furthermore, the surveyed firms tried to take advantage of subsidies mostly, if they 
were uncertain about an applicant’s productivity. 
To investigate the wage effects of the subsidy variants under consideration, we util-
ize an excerpt from the Treatment Effects and Prediction data (TrEffeR) of the Ger-
man Public Employment Service (Stephan et al. 2006). The data cover the years 
2000 to 2007 and combine data flows from the distinct computer based operative 
systems of the Public Employment Service on periods of registered job search, reg-
istered unemployment, participation in labor market programs and employment. 
Even though the TrEffeR data set is not available for public use, it is composed of 
the same data flows as the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute 
for Employment Research. Hummel et al. (2005) describe an IEB sample that is 
open for public use through the Research Data Center of the German Public Em-
ployment Service. 
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Because the TrEffeR data provide only sparse information on employment periods, 
we add information on the characteristics of the job – in particular on wages – from 
the employment history files (BeH) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). 
These files provide more detailed information on wages and on the establishment; 
they are based on notifications of employment to social security bodies. Daily wages 
are computed by dividing the entire payment during an employment spell by the 
duration of the spell in days (including days without work). However, there is an up-
per bound on the wage information at the social security thresholds. For the merged 
data set, we had to correct several smaller inconsistencies within and between both 
underlying data sets. Regarding the duration of subsidization, the data provide in-
formation on factual, but not on planned program duration. Regrettably, the data do 
not provide information on working times of individual workers and whether an em-
ployer applies a collective contract. 
The sample underlying the estimates covers all individuals who entered full-time 
employment during the second quarter of 2003 directly after a period of registered 
unemployment, which lasted seven days to one year. Our analysis takes into ac-
count only individuals aged 25 to 49 at the beginning of this unemployment spell, 
since younger and older persons might be eligible for specific programs for their age 
groups. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to individuals who were not registered 
as unemployed for at least three months prior to the unemployment spell. Individuals 
might have participated in other programs earlier during their unemployment spell. 
Among participants in the wage subsidy schemes, we excluded those whose sub-
sidization period exceeded one year. Among individuals not participating in the sub-
sidy schemes, we exclude those who had a previous employment spell within the 
same firm during the first quarter of 2003 already. While our sample is restricted to 
individuals entering a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003, these persons 
may also be observed in marginal employment or part-time employment at some 
points of time during the entire observation period, ranging from 2000 to 2007. 
When computing the wage outcome variables, we exclude all marginal employment 
spells and spells with a daily wage rate of less than 10 Euro from our analysis as 
well as further periods of subsidized employment. If we observe parallel employment 
spells, we pick out only the spell with the highest daily wage rate (another possibility 
would have been to add up wage rates at each point of time). Finally, the employ-
ment history files cover only information on wages subject to social security contri-
butions – which excludes self-employment – and information up to the social secu-
rity threshold. We abstain from imputing estimated wage rates for censored wages 
(see for instance Gartner 2004), because for our samples of treated and comparison 
persons wages very seldom reach the social security threshold of around 165 Euro 
per day. Instead, we exclude those – very few – individuals who earned a daily 
wage rate above this threshold during our observation period. 
Because wages usually are lower in East Germany than in West Germany, and 
lower for female compared to male workers, we present separate results by gender 
and region. Even though we display only findings from joint estimates for both vari-
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ants of wage subsidies under consideration, we also conducted separate estimates 
for both variants and describe the results briefly. 
4 Estimators of interest and econometric approach 
We are interested in the mean difference of wages between workers taking up sub-
sidized employment during the second quarter of 2003 and otherwise comparable 
workers who started an unsubsidized employment relationship during this time pe-
riod. However, we can expect subsidized workers to be a “negative” selection of all 
newly hired workers – otherwise they would probably not have needed a subsidy to 
obtain employment. Thus, comparisons of the full samples of subsidized and un-
subsidized workers would reflect to a certain degree the selection of workers – influ-
enced by themselves, by caseworkers and by firms – into subsidization. To account 
for observed differences between the two groups, we select groups of workers that 
are similar to the subsidized ones using statistical matching methods (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). We estimate a binary probit to estimate the probability to be subsi-
dized for each individual taking up a job – the propensity score – and select a com-
parison group of newly hired unsubsidized workers such that the distributions of the 
propensity scores are similar for both groups of workers.  
Table 1 
Variables used for the propensity score matching 
Variable group Variables 
Individual socio-
demographic  
characteristics 
Measured at the beginning of the unemployment spell: Marital 
status, nationality, age group, health problems, degree of disabil-
ity, attained degree of schooling and education, recipient of un-
employment benefits or assistance. 
Job characteristics 
Blue or white collar worker, broad occupational classification, 
local rate of hiring to unemployment and local unemployment rate 
in the worker’s occupation (three digit code) 
Local labor market  
characteristics 
Performance cluster of the regional labor market (Blien et al. 
2004) 
Firm characteristics 
Firm size class, sectoral affiliation, mean daily wage in firm (three 
categories), mean share of workers with university degree (two 
categories). 
Individual labor market 
history 
Participation in an active labor market program during the unem-
ployment spell (seven categories) 
Measured since the start of the unemployment spell: Duration 
until taking up the job.  
Measured at the start of the unemployment spell: Duration in em-
ployment (last three years) and duration in unemployment (last 
two years), participation in labor market programs (last two 
years), sanctioned through caseworker (last two years) and peri-
ods of illness (last two years).  
 
The process generated data that we use encompass a comprehensive number of 
variables describing individual and firm characteristics as well as the regional labor 
market. These variables should be crucial for the assignment process into subsi-
dized employment as well for the subsequent wage outcomes and can thus be util-
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ized to choose a comparison group of individuals entering unsubsidized employ-
ment by means of propensity score matching. In detail, our choice of comparison 
groups is based on the variables described in Table 1, which are mostly categorized 
as dummy variables. Note that wage subsidies are often combined with short-term 
training measures in firms, often within the same firm. We do not account for partici-
pation in a short firm-internal training that took place directly within the month before 
taking up the job, because – instead of making treated and non-treated persons 
more similar – this would indicate heterogeneity: Some participants in short-firm 
internal training might have turned out to be sufficiently productive for an unsubsi-
dized job, whereas other have not. 
We perform a radius matching (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002) that matches participants 
with “synthetic comparison persons”, composed of a weighted equivalent of all per-
sons falling within the radius of their propensity score, and apply a caliper – a maxi-
mum distance of propensity scores between treated and comparison persons – of 
0.0005. Estimates are performed using the stata module psmatch2 (Leuven & 
Sianesi 2003). Note that we conducted several robustness checks of our estimates 
and experimented with different calipers as well as different matching algorithms, 
and present those with a particularly good matching quality. However, our results 
regarding wage differences between treatment and comparison group turned out to 
be very stable, regardless of the particular matching algorithm or caliper chosen. 
For a first assessment of wage differences between the treatment group and the 
comparison group chosen by propensity score matching, we study three outcomes 
variables: 
1a) The daily starting wage when taking up a job during the second quarter of 2003. 
1b) The mean daily wage when employed during the 3.5 years after taking up this 
job. 
1c) The mean daily wage during the 3.5 years after taking up this job, imputing a 
wage of zero for times without regular employment, thus mirroring the develop-
ment of cumulated wages. 
However, propensity matching might not be sufficient to balance features between 
subsidized and unsubsidized workers – while the one group was able to find an un-
subsidized job, the other was at least partly not able. To account for remaining time-
constant unobserved individual heterogeneity between the treatment and the com-
parison group, we investigate also the development of wages before and after the 
relevant job has been taken up, thus applying a difference-in-differences strategy. 
For this purpose we compute:  
2a) The difference between 1a) and the latest daily wage observed in the three 
years preceding the entry into the analyzed job, imputing a wage of zero if the 
worker has not been employed during this time period. 
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2b) The difference between 1b) and the mean daily wage when employed during 
the 3 years preceding the entry into the analyzed job. 
2c) The difference between 1c) and the mean daily wage during the 3 years pre-
ceding this job, imputing a wage of zero for times without regular employment, 
thus displaying the difference in cumulated wages over time. 
Finally, firms that hire subsidized workers might also be inherently different from 
firms that do not utilize subsidies. For instance, managers of these firms might have 
stronger social attitudes than managers of other firms. In particular, firms where 
learning on the job enhances productivity considerably might be suited to close a 
temporary productivity gap of newly hired workers by means of a subsidy. Also, 
firms with comparatively low settling-in costs may take the risk to hire persons with 
an “unemployment stigma”, if this risk is reimbursed by means of a subsidy. Given 
that we already account for several firm characteristics in our propensity score esti-
mates, we thus conduct an additional analysis restricted to the sample of firms that 
hired at least one subsidized and one unsubsidized worker during the second quar-
ter of 2003. The aim of this step is to control as far as possible for unobserved time-
constant firm heterogeneity. For this subset, we reduce the caliper to 0.01, because 
the relationship of potential comparison persons to treated persons diminishes 
strongly. 
5 Empirical results 
Before matching, our base sample consists of roughly 10,000 persons taking up a 
subsidized and 170,000 persons taking up an unsubsidized job. In West Germany, 
around 3 percent of all hires in the sample were subsidized; more than 10 percent 
were subsidized in East Germany. The mean actual duration of subsidization 
amounted to 4 months in West Germany, to 5 months for men in East Germany and 
to 6 months for women in East Germany. We do not have individual information on 
the size of the subsidy, but information merged through cost accounting at the local 
level indicates that the average daily subsidy amounted to about 20 Euros, with av-
erage costs of subsidization around 2500 Euros in West Germany up to more than 
3000 Euros for East German female workers. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix presents mean values of the variables underlying the pro-
pensity score matching before the matching took place: i) Regarding socio-
demographics, workers supported by a subsidy have over-proportionally received 
unemployment assistance compared to those who took up an unsubsidized job; 
differences are rather small regarding further features. ii) Looking at the job charac-
teristics, more of those in subsidized jobs are occupied in a white collar job, less 
often in a manufacturing occupation. iii) Subsidized employment relationships are 
found comparatively more often in urban labor markets with high or medium unem-
ployment as well as in rural areas with below average unemployment. iv) Rather 
strong selectivity effects seem to exist on the firm’s side. Subsidized employment 
can be found over-proportionally in small firms and in branches such as sales and 
IAB-Discussion Paper 9/2009 15 
data processing, R&D and other economic services. A much higher share of unsub-
sidized than of subsidized workers takes up work in the construction sector, in ho-
tels and restaurants, as well as in temporary help. Furthermore, subsidized workers 
are less often found in high wage firms. v) Turning to the individual labor market 
history, those who took up a subsidized job have participated more often in another 
labor market program during their current unemployment spell and had been unem-
ployed for longer than those who found a job without the help of a subsidy. Further-
more, during the years preceding their unemployment spell, they have spent less 
time in employment and more time in unemployment. Also, the share that had al-
ready participated in labor market programs and had experienced sickness periods 
is significantly higher. Taken all together, differences between subsidized and un-
subsidized workers seem to manifest themselves mainly in the labor market history 
of workers (less in their socio-demographic characteristics) and in the selection into 
smaller firms within particular branches. Note that while we are interested in wages 
similar workers receive within similar firms, this selection process into firms certainly 
deserves more future research. To convey an impression of the unconditional wage 
distributions, Figure 1 shows kernel estimates of the distribution of daily starting 
wages for the four groups under consideration. 
Figure 1 
Full sample – Kernel estimates of the distributions of daily wages directly after 
taking up the job 
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Note:  Previously unemployed workers taking up a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003. Subsi-
dies include subsidies for training requirements as well as subsidies for hard-to-place workers. 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 9/2009 16 
Table 2 
Full sample – Mean daily wages and wage differences over time for subsidized 
workers (S) and unsubsidized workers (U) and wage differences (Δ) before and 
after matching (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Full sample  
 Men West  Women West  Men East  Women East  
Matching S U Δ  S U Δ  S U Δ  S U Δ  
1a) Daily wage directly after taking-up the job 
Before 61.7 66.0 -4.3 ** 49.4 54.1 -4.7** 50.9 53.0 -2.0** 39.2 40.7 -1.5 ** 
 (18.7) (23.1) (0.4) (18.6) (24.4) (0.8) (13.1) (16.0) (0.3) (13.4) (16.2) (0.4) 
After 61.8 62.1 -0.2 49.6 50.1 -0.5 51.0 52.1 -1.2** 39.3 40.0 -0.6 
  (18.7) (22.4) (0.4)  (18.5) (21.9) (0.7)  (13.2) (15.4) (0.3)  (13.6) (15.9) (0.5)  
1b) Mean daily wage when employed during the 3.5 years after taking-up the job 
Before 63.6 67.6 -4.1 ** 50.8 56.2 -5.3** 52.4 54.1 -1.7** 40.1 41.4 -1.3 ** 
 (19.6) (22.8) (0.4) (19.7) (25.5) (0.8) (14.2) (15.9) (0.3) (14.6) (17.0) (0.4) 
After 63.8 63.9 -0.1 51.2 51.9 -0.7 52.5 53.3 -0.8** 40.3 40.8 -0.5 
  (19.6) (22.3) (0.4)  (19.8) (22.8) (0.7)  (14.3) (15.9) (0.3)  (14.7) (16.5) (0.5)  
1c) Mean daily wage during the 3.5 years after taking-up the job 
Before 44.7 47.1 -2.4 ** 36.3 39.9 -3.6** 38.2 36.1 2.1** 29.4 27.1 2.3 ** 
 (27.9) (30.0) (0.5) (24.5) (29.4) (0.9) (20.4) (21.7) (0.4) (18.2) (20.3) (0.5) 
After 45.1 42.1 3.1 ** 37.0 35.3 1.7* 38.7 34.8 3.9** 29.9 26.6 3.3 ** 
 (27.8) (29.6) (0.5) (24.5) (26.7) (0.9) (20.3) (22.3) (0.4) (18.1) (20.2) (0.6) 
2a) Difference 1a) and latest daily wage observed in the three years preceding the job 
Before 4.6 0.7 3.9 ** 4.8 2.7 2.2** 1.9 0.9 1.1** 5.8 3.1 2.7 ** 
 (28.1) (24.3) (0.4) (25.2) (25.0) (0.8) (21.9) (18.5) (0.3) (21.5) (18.8) (0.5) 
After 4.5 3.7 0.8 4.6 5.0 -0.4 1.5 3.0 -1.5** 5.4 6.2 -0.8 
  (28.0) (27.8) (0.5)  (25.3) (26.7) (0.9)  (21.7) (20.8) (0.4)  (21.1) (21.8) (0.6)  
2b) Difference 1b) and mean daily wage when employed during the 3 years preceding the job 
Before 6.2 3.2 2.9 ** 6.9 6.3 0.6 4.2 3.3 0.9** 6.9 4.6 2.3 ** 
 (26.1) (21.3) (0.4) (24.3) (23.6) (0.7) (19.2) (16.0) (0.3) (20.7) (18.0) (0.5) 
After 6.1 5.8 0.3 6.9 7.5 -0.6 3.9 5.0 -1.1** 6.4 7.5 -1.1 
 (26.0) (25.6) (0.5) (24.3) (25.6) (0.8) (18.9) (19.2) (0.3) (20.3) (21.0) (0.6) 
2c) Difference 1c) and mean daily wage during the 3 years preceding the job 
Before 11.7 3.1 8.6 ** 11.2 5.6 5.7** 9.4 2.5 6.9** 12.4 5.0 7.4 ** 
 (29.1) (28.6) (0.5) (26.1) (28.1) (0.9) (21.7) (21.4) (0.4) (20.3) (20.1) (0.5) 
After 11.8 8.6 3.2 ** 11.5 9.1 2.3** 9.4 5.7 3.7** 12.1 9.3 2.7 ** 
  (29.0) (29.5) (0.6)  (26.1) (27.0) (0.9)  (21.6) (22.6) (0.4)  (20.3) (21.3) (0.6)  
  Observations MSB   Observations MSB   Observations MSB   Observations MSB   
Before 3130 87119 12.4 1039 31201 12.2 3969 37639 9.6 1672 10866 11.6 
After 3060 86914 0.8  998 30488 1.0  3823 37003 0.5  1522 9926 1.2  
*) Significant at α = 0.05. **) Significant at α = 0.01. 
Note:  Previously unemployed workers taking up a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003. Compari-
son persons have been selected by means of a radius matching and a caliper of 0.0005. Subsidies 
include subsidies for training requirements as well as subsidies for hard-to-place workers. With the 
exception of the first subsidized employment spell, only times in unsubsidized employment are con-
sidered. 
 
How do wages of subsidized and unsubsidized workers differ before and after the 
propensity score matching took place? Table 2 presents the main results of the 
wage analysis. Let us first note that the mean standardized bias (MSB; given in the 
last rows of the Table) between the two groups of workers decreases considerably 
through matching, indicating a very good quality of the comparison group. Further-
more, as is usually found, wages are higher in West than in East Germany and 
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higher for male than for female workers. Average daily starting wages are found in 
the first column of 1a) in Table 2. It is noteworthy that average wage rates are rather 
low for our entire sample of previously unemployed individuals, and in particular for 
subsidized workers: Rhein & Stamm (2006) utilize the same data base underlying 
our wage information, the employment history files (BeH), to estimate the low-wage 
threshold for Germany, defined as two third of the median wage rate of all employ-
ment relationships observed at June 30. For the year 2003, the threshold amounted 
to a monthly wage rate of 1772 Euro in West and 1273 Euro in East Germany. As-
suming that a month has 30 days, this corresponded to a daily wage rate of 59 Euro 
in West and 42 Euro in East Germany. Thus in our sample, subsidized male workers 
in West Germany (62 Euro) are on average just above the low-wage threshold, 
while female workers (49 and 39 Euro, respectively) are generally found below, and 
only male workers in East Germany (51 Euro) earn on average considerably more. 
Figure 2 
Full sample – Share of subsidized workers and matched comparison persons in 
employment as well as difference in shares 
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Note:  Previously unemployed workers taking up a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003. Confi-
dence intervals for the difference in shares are given for α = 0.05. Comparison persons have been 
selected by means of a radius matching and a caliper of 0.0005. Subsidies include subsidies for 
training requirements as well as subsidies for hard-to-place workers. With the exception of the first 
subsidized employment spell, only times in unsubsidized employment are considered. 
 
Before matching, the mean starting daily wage after taking up the job (1a) is signifi-
cantly lower for subsidized workers across all four groups investigated; the differ-
ence is around twice as large in West Germany (around 4 to 5 Euros) than in East 
Germany (around 2 Euros). Unconditional wage differences between subsidized and 
unsubsidized workers can, however, mostly be explained by the characteristics of 
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the worker, the local labor market and the firm – after the matching took place, the 
differences in starting wages decline considerably and remain significant only for 
East German men. Results are similar if we take a look at the mean daily wage dur-
ing days of employment in the 3.5 years after taking up the job (1b). However, if we 
compute the mean daily wage across these 3.5 years, imputing zero wages for days 
without employment (1c), we find that subsidized workers earn 2 to 4 Euros more 
per day than their unsubsidized counterparts after matching. The underlying reason 
is depicted in Figure 2: The share of subsidized workers in regular employment is 
usually higher during the observation period than the share of unsubsidized work-
ers. In particular, during the first months in employment, subsidized employment 
relationships are more stable than unsubsidized ones (see also Ruppe 2009 and 
Jaenichen & Stephan 2009) and seem to be less subject to seasonal adjustments – 
even within the same branches. While differences in employment shares are only 
partly significant in West Germany, they are quite substantial in East Germany. 
In a next step, we compare the wage rates described above with appropriate “coun-
terparts” that workers had received before their unemployment spell, to cancel out 
time-constant unobserved individual heterogeneity among workers that might have 
remained after matching on observables. If we compare the starting wage with the 
last wage earned before unemployment (2a), we find that subsidized workers – 
compared to all other newly hired workers – have experienced a significantly larger 
mean gain in daily wages, ranging from about 1 to nearly 4 Euros in the four groups 
investigated. However, compared to the selected comparison group of unsubsidized 
workers, the difference vanishes and turns – while small – even significantly nega-
tive for male East German workers. Results for the matched sample are similar for 
mean daily wages of subsidized and similar unsubsidized workers, cumulated over 
longer periods (2b). Comparing mean wages over these time periods and imputing 
wages of zero for days without employment, we find a mean wage gain of subsi-
dized compared to all unsubsidized workers (2c) of about 6 to 9 Euros. Again, re-
stricting the comparison to the matched counterparts, differences remain mostly 
significant and amount to roughly 3 Euros. 
Finally, Table 3 displays the results for an analysis restricted to individuals taking up 
a job in a firm that has hired at least one subsidized and one unsubsidized worker. 
This step intends to partly control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, because it 
might be that only a strongly self-selected group of firms makes use of wage subsi-
dies. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 9/2009 19 
Table 3 
Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers – Mean daily wages and 
wage differences over time for subsidized workers (S) and unsubsidized workers 
(U) and wage difference (Δ) before and after matching (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers  
 Men West  Women West  Men East  Women East  
Matching S U Δ  S U Δ  S U Δ  S U Δ  
1a) Daily wage directly after taking-up the job 
Before 58.7 54.9 3.8 ** 49.7 44.6 5.1** 51.8 49.0 2.8** 39.9 38.0 1.9 * 
 (19.5) (20.5) (0.8) (17.5) (17.2) (1.3) (13.6) (14.5) (0.5) (13.1) (12.8) (0.8) 
After 58.6 57.7 0.9 49.9 47.4 2.5 51.8 51.0 0.8 39.8 39.8 0.0 
  (19.3) (20.4) (1.0)  (17.5) (18.4) (1.9)  (13.6) (13.9) (0.6)  (13.2) (12.2) (1.1)  
1b) Mean daily wage when employed during the 3.5 years after taking-up the job 
Before 60.8 59.1 1.7 * 52.5 48.4 4.1** 53.4 51.3 2.0** 41.5 40.0 1.6 
 (19.4) (20.7) (0.8) (18.7) (18.5) (1.4) (14.5) (14.7) (0.5) (14.0) (14.0) (0.9) 
After 60.8 60.2 0.6 52.8 50.1 2.7 53.4 52.6 0.8 41.4 41.2 0.2 
  (19.3) (20.4) (1.0)  (18.7) (19.5) (2.0)  (14.5) (14.3) (0.6)  (13.9) (13.5) (1.2)  
1c) Mean daily wage during the 3.5 years after taking-up the job 
Before 41.5 39.8 1.7 37.7 30.8 6.9** 38.0 34.5 3.5** 30.8 27.3 3.5 ** 
 (26.8) (28.1) (1.1) (24.1) (24.1) (1.8) (21.3) (20.7) (0.7) (18.0) (18.6) (1.1) 
After 41.6 38.6 3.0 * 38.2 30.1 8.1** 38.2 34.1 4.1** 30.9 27.7 3.1 * 
 (26.7) (28.6) (1.3) (24.3) (24.4) (2.6) (21.1) (20.8) (0.8) (17.7) (19.1) (1.5) 
2a) Difference 1a) and latest daily wage observed in the three years preceding the job 
Before 4.9 -3.2 8.1 ** 5.0 -1.4 6.4** 2.9 -0.8 3.7** 6.9 1.2 5.8 ** 
 (27.9) (24.1) (1.0) (26.2) (23.8) (1.8) (21.3) (18.4) (0.7) (21.9) (17.8) (1.2) 
After 4.4 2.9 1.5 4.0 1.9 2.1 2.7 1.5 1.1 6.1 6.2 -0.1 
  (27.6) (27.1) (1.3)  (26.1) (25.7) (2.7)  (21.2) (20.0) (0.8)  (21.3) (21.3) (1.6)  
2b) Difference 1b) and mean daily wage when employed during the 3 years preceding the job. 
Before 5.5 0.8 4.7 ** 8.2 2.9 5.3** 4.5 2.3 2.3** 8.2 3.7 4.5 ** 
 (25.6) (21.3) (0.9) (25.5) (20.1) (1.6) (18.8) (16.0) (0.6) (21.3) (16.8) (1.2) 
After 5.1 5.7 -0.6 7.3 6.1 1.2 4.4 4.0 0.5 7.4 8.4 -1.0 
 (25.2) (25.6) (1.1) (25.3) (21.4) (2.4) (18.6) (17.7) (0.7) (20.5) (19.4) (1.5) 
2c) Difference 1c) and mean daily wage during the 3 years preceding the job 
Before 10.7 1.7 9.0 ** 13.2 1.4 11.8** 9.4 3.0 6.4** 14.4 5.0 9.4 ** 
 (27.9) (26.7) (1.0) (27.1) (24.3) (1.8) (21.7) (20.9) (0.7) (21.3) (19.1) (1.2) 
After 10.5 8.1 2.4 12.5 5.7 6.7* 9.3 5.5 3.8** 13.9 10.4 3.5 * 
  (27.5) (28.7) (1.3)  (26.9) (26.4) (2.7)  (21.6) (21.3) (0.9)  (21.0) (19.9) (1.6)  
  Observations MSB   Observations MSB   Observations MSB   Observations MSB   
Before 953 2277 10.5 253 681 13.5 1274 2397 8.9 414 672 12.9 
After 932 2277 2.6  227 670 4.6  1236 2383 1.4  382 610 3.7  
*) Significant at α = 0.05. **) Significant at α = 0.01. 
Note:  Previously unemployed workers taking up a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003. Compari-
son persons have been selected by means of a radius matching and a caliper of 0.01. Subsidies in-
clude subsidies for training requirements as well as subsidies for hard-to-place workers. With the ex-
ception of the first subsidized employment spell, only times in unsubsidized employment are consid-
ered. 
 
As can be seen in the lower part of Table 3, the remaining number of observations 
is smaller and decreases to around 30 percent of the full sample for those subsi-
dized and to around 4 percent for those not subsidized. Also the quality of the 
matching – as indicated by the mean standardized bias (MSB) – is poorer, but still in 
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an acceptable range. Descriptive statistics for these selected groups of workers can 
also be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. It indicates that – compared to the full 
sample – these firms employ an over-proportionally high share of unqualified blue 
collar workers, are quite often located in urban areas with medium unemployment, 
mostly employ between 10 and 249 employees and are often temporary help firms 
(West Germany) or in the construction sector (East Germany). Figure 3 displays the 
subsequent employment rates for subsidized and unsubsidized workers within the 
matched sample, which are again higher among subsidized workers.  
Figure 3 
Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers – Share of subsidized 
workers and matched comparison persons in employment as well as difference 
in shares 
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Note:  Previously unemployed workers taking up a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003. Confi-
dence intervals for the difference in shares are given for α = 0.05. Comparison persons have been 
selected by means of a radius matching and a caliper of 0.01. Subsidies include subsidies for train-
ing requirements as well as subsidies for hard-to-place workers. With the exception of the first sub-
sidized employment spell, only times in unsubsidized employment are considered. 
 
Table 3 shows that mean wages of newly hired workers are generally lower within 
this group of firms than in the full sample, and in particular they are lower for work-
ers hired without a supporting subsidy. If we look at the results before matching, 
subsidized workers experience significant positive wage gains (1a). Thus at a first 
glance, subsidized workers within these firms might be either a positive selection or 
pocket part of the subsidy. However, differences do not remain significant after the 
matching took place. This is also the case after matching if we compute the mean 
daily wage when employed (1b), or if we look at wage differences to the previous job 
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(2a, 2b). However, we again find wage gains for subsidized workers during the 3.5 
years after taking-up the job, when we impute zero wages for days without regular 
employment. 
For robustness checks, all estimates have also been conducted for individuals who 
did not enter any (other) labor market program during the unemployment spell. Re-
sults were very similar to those presented above. Furthermore, we separately re-
peated the estimates for subsidies directed towards training requirements and sub-
sidies for hard-to-place workers. While we will not present the results in detail, some 
findings are noteworthy: As could have been expected, average daily wages are 
lower – by up to 10 Euro – for individuals receiving a subsidy for hard-to-place work-
ers than for those receiving one for training requirements. While their average em-
ployment shares over time are also lower, the difference in employment shares 
compared to a matched comparison group is higher, which indicates a higher effec-
tiveness of the program for individuals with more severe obstacles to reintegration 
into the labor market. Regarding wage differences between subsidized and similar 
unsubsidized workers, we find again nearly no significant differences after matching 
for both variants of the subsidy.  
Finally, although this is not the main topic of our paper, a simple fiscal cost-benefit-
analysis for subsidized workers is presented in Appendix B. This enables us to get a 
very rough impression of the efficiency of the subsidy. While the findings should be 
interpreted with care, they indicate that wage subsidies – because of on average 
higher subsequent employment shares of participants – might be self-financing over 
the longer run if adverse indirect effects (depicted in detail in the Appendix) are not 
too large.  
6 Summary and conclusions 
For Germany, this paper investigates a sample of full-time workers of age 25 to 49, 
who were hired out of registered unemployment during the second quarter of 2003. 
We ask how subsequent wages differ between workers who took up a subsidized or 
unsubsidized job, respectively. Previous research for North America has indicated 
that subsidized workers might participate in rent-sharing from subsidies, if firms can 
apply for tax credits when hiring eligible workers (Hamersma 2005). On the other 
hand, only low-wage workers had an incentive to utilize the wage subsidy, if vouch-
ers were handed out directly to randomly selected workers (Dubin & Rivers 1993) or 
randomly selected workers had to become eligible and then qualify for a generous 
in-wage benefit (Brouillette & Lacroix 2008), thus the estimated impact on wages of 
actually subsidized workers was negative. 
In Germany, the most important wage subsidy programs in the time period under 
consideration granted time-limited supplements to firms that hired hard-to-place 
workers or hired workers into jobs with particular training requirements. The size 
and duration of these subsidies were negotiated between caseworkers and firms. To 
present first results on the wages of workers supported by such a subsidy, we use a 
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large process generated data set, providing information on individual, regional and 
firm characteristics as well as on wage rates received during a previous period. We 
compare their wages with those of unsubsidized workers. In a first step, to account 
as far as possible for observed heterogeneity, we selected a comparison group by 
means of a propensity score matching. In a second step, to cancel out time-constant 
individual heterogeneity, we combined this with a difference-in-differences ap-
proach, focusing on the wage development of individual workers before and after 
taking up the new job. Finally and in a third step, to also consider unobserved time-
constant firm heterogeneity, we restricted the analysis to a sample of firms hiring 
subsidized as well as unsubsidized workers.  
For the full sample, the findings show – as would have been expected – that mean 
wages of subsidized workers were significantly lower than those of the average 
hired person. However, after conducting a comparison with a group of unsubsidized 
workers, selected by means of propensity score matching, wage rates of both 
groups were mostly not significantly different. If we concentrate on individual wages 
changes compared to a previous period, the difference in individual wage changes 
between subsidized and unsubsidized workers with similar observed characteristics 
is mostly insignificant as well. However, it is noteworthy that initially subsidized 
workers subsequently have higher employment rates, resulting in significantly higher 
cumulated wages during the time frame investigated. If we aggregate these higher 
wages due to higher employment rates over the observation period of 3.5 years, 
based on the estimates 1c) in Table 2, we end up with additional earnings of subsi-
dized workers of 2,200 Euros (women in West Germany) up to 5,000 Euros (men in 
East Germany). Accordingly, a simple fiscal cost-benefit analysis based on these 
estimates indicates that the subsidy might pay out from a fiscal point of view in the 
longer run. It relies, however, on the assumption that higher subsequent employ-
ment shares are in fact the result of subsidization and that no large scale substitu-
tion and crowding-out effects occur. To take these indirect effects into account, an 
additional macro-level analysis would be required. 
In a further step, we restricted the analysis to a sample of firms that hired unsubsi-
dized as well as subsidized workers during the time period under investigation. 
Within this self-selected group of firms (often temporary help firms), starting wages 
of subsidized workers were in fact even higher than for the average newly hired un-
subsidized worker, but the significance of the effect vanishes for the matched sam-
ple. Taking again a difference-in-differences approach, we also do not find signifi-
cant wage differences. Subsequent employment rates of subsidized workers are 
also mostly higher within this sample of firms, inducing average wage gains over 3.5 
years by way of higher employment rates. 
How might the difference – mostly insignificant wage differences between subsi-
dized and similar unsubsidized workers – to the North American studies cited above 
be explained? While the law prescribes that only wages up to the collectively nego-
tiated or the local customary level, respectively, and up to social security thresholds 
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could be taken into account, no explicit legal lower or upper bound on wages as 
such is given. While local labor market offices seem to refuse subsidies, if wages 
significantly undercut the local customary wage level, our main explanation is that 
the German system of wage setting is shaped by collective contracts and an at-
tachment of wages to jobs rather than to individual abilities: The ubiquity of collec-
tive contracts implies that lower or higher wages for subsidized workers than for 
unsubsidized workers within similar jobs and within the same firm might first not be 
feasible (if the firm is covered by a collective contract and the worker is unionized) 
and second and even more important, be assessed as not acceptable or unfair, re-
spectively, by workers, firms’ management and also by caseworkers. This should 
hold in particular regarding wage-undercutting because subsidized jobs are on av-
erage rather low-wage jobs.  
To conclude, empirically observed wage effects of wage subsidies seem to hinge 
crucially on the design of the subsidy scheme and on the institutional environment. 
For Germany, our study does not present evidence on rent-sharing between work-
ers and firms to exploit the schemes under consideration. We find no hints on wage-
cutting in subsidized jobs either. However, because subsidized jobs go hand in hand 
with subsequent higher employment shares and are of longer duration on average 
(see also Ruppe 2009), in the longer run at least part of the subsidy could be reim-
bursed through higher taxes and social security contributions as well as lower ex-
penditures for unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance. 
However, although we control for a comprehensive set of individual, firm and re-
gional labor market characteristics as well as for time-constant unobserved worker 
heterogeneity, we cannot claim to have estimated causal effects on the labor market 
results of subsidized workers: Our results do not preclude that those subsidized 
would not have been recruited at the same wage rate and with the same subse-
quent employment rates in the absence of a subsidy as well, which would induce a 
deadweight loss. In Germany, it is mainly a careful assessment of individual place-
ment difficulties regarding the particular job on the caseworker’s side that could pre-
vent such deadweight effects. Furthermore, the widespread use of subsidies – in 
particular in East Germany – might have an adverse impact on reservation wages of 
unemployed workers. Again, it is one of the difficult tasks of caseworkers to pre-
clude such adverse incentive effects. 
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Appendix A: Variable means 
Table A.1 
Variable means for subsidized workers (S) and unsubsidized workers (U) before matching 
 Full sample Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers 
  Men West Women West Men East Women East  Men West Women West Men East Women East 
  S U S U S U S U S U S U S U S U 
Married 0.48 0.50 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.57 0.49 0.46 0.36 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.60 0.57
Foreigner 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Age 25-29 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.15
Age 30-34 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.19
Age 35-39 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.23
Age 40-44 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.25
Age 45-49 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.17
Health problems 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04
Slightly disabled 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Severely disabled 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
No secondary degree 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03
Secondary degree (Hauptschule) 0.55 0.60 0.36 0.39 0.21 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.59 0.59 0.40 0.41 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.18
Secondary degree (Realschule) 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.33 0.69 0.67 0.76 0.73 0.18 0.21 0.34 0.35 0.69 0.66 0.78 0.73
Secondary degree (Gymnasium) 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06
No vocational training 0.31 0.30 0.20 0.26 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.34 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09
Vocational training 0.64 0.66 0.73 0.66 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.62 0.64 0.72 0.60 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.88
University degree 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
Unemployment benefits receipt 0.53 0.70 0.60 0.71 0.59 0.72 0.49 0.72 0.49 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.58 0.68 0.50 0.70
Unemployment assistance receipt 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.28 0.13 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.29 0.17
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No benefit receipt 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.14
Unqualified blue collar worker 0.45 0.45 0.19 0.33 0.23 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.52 0.56 0.32 0.49 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.42
Qualified blue collar worker 0.34 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.66 0.65 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.11 0.07 0.65 0.64 0.27 0.31
White collar worker 0.21 0.16 0.70 0.57 0.12 0.07 0.55 0.40 0.15 0.10 0.57 0.44 0.08 0.05 0.47 0.27
Agrarian or mining occupation 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06
Manufacturing occupation 0.57 0.62 0.16 0.18 0.72 0.76 0.14 0.20 0.60 0.61 0.23 0.30 0.75 0.73 0.16 0.26
Technical occupation 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03
Service occupation 0.35 0.33 0.78 0.78 0.22 0.20 0.75 0.71 0.32 0.34 0.72 0.66 0.20 0.22 0.74 0.66
Local rate hirings/unemployment in 3-digit-occ. 1.67 2.03 2.16 2.55 0.88 0.91 0.87 1.02 1.62 1.69 2.00 2.00 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.83
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Local unemployment rate in 3-digit-occupation 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.30  0.21 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.32
Table A.1 continued: Variable means for subsidized workers (S) and unsubsidized workers (U) before matching 
 
   Full sample Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers 
  Men West Women West Men East Women East  Men West Women West Men East Women East 
  S U S U S U S U S U S U S U S U 
East Germany, worst situation - - - - 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.12 - - - - 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.11
East Germany, bad situation - - - - 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.66 - - - - 0.67 0.65 0.58 0.60
East Germany, high unemployment - - - - 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.19 - - - - 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.27
Urban area, high unemployment 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Urban area, medium unemployment 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.15 - - - - 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.21 - - - -
Above average unemp., moderate dynamics 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.10 - - - - 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.12 - - - -
Rural area, average unemployment 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 - - - - 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 - - - -
Rural area, below average unemployment 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.18 - - - - 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.24 - - - -
Center, good situation and high dynamics 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.13 - - - - 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 - - - -
Rural area, good situation and high dynamics 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.05 - - - - 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 - - - -
Small-business dominated, good situation 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.15 - - - - 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 - - - -
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Very good situation 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 - - - - 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.06 - - - -
Firm size < 10 0.44 0.32 0.49 0.31 0.41 0.34 0.50 0.40 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.10
Firm size 10-49 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.40 0.39 0.31 0.31 0.38 0.29 0.40 0.21 0.48 0.40 0.32 0.27
Firm size 50-249 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.39 0.51 0.37 0.56 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.47
Firm size 250-499 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Firm size > 500 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.11
Manufacturing sector 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.29 0.24
Construction sector 0.18 0.29 0.05 0.03 0.33 0.42 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.35 0.30 0.06 0.04
Sales sector 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.09
Hotels and restaurants 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.15
Transport, storage and communication sector 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.03
Financial intermediation sector  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real estate activities 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Temporay help firms and personal services 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.31 0.52 0.30 0.52 0.12 0.26 0.09 0.18
Data processing, R&D, other economic services 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13
Health and social work services 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.06
Private household services 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08
Mean daily wage in firm < 45 Euro 0.28 0.25 0.40 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.65 0.65 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.40 0.58 0.68
Mean daily wage in firm 45-74 Euro 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.57 0.56 0.32 0.30 0.55 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.56 0.39 0.29
Mean daily wage in firm >= 75 Euro 0.20 0.28 0.15 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02
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Firm's share with university degree >= 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
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Table A.1 continued: Variable means for subsidized workers (S) and unsubsidized workers (U) before matching 
 
 Full sample Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers 
  Men West Women West Men East Women East  Men West Women West Men East Women East 
  S U S U S U S U S U S U S U S U 
During current unemp.: Start-up subsidy 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
During current unemp.: Wage subsidy 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
During current unemp.: Further vocational training 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 
During current unemp.: Short training within firm* 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.09 
During current unemp.: Short classroom training 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.19 0.13 
During current unemp.: Public job creation scheme 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
During current unemp.: Other program 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Job entry during month 1 of unmployment 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Job entry during month 2-3 of unemployment 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.10 0.27 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.19 
Job entry during month 4-6 of unemployment 0.29 0.43 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.29 0.37 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.28 0.37 
Job entry during month 7-9 of unemployment 0.27 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.23 
Job entry during month 10-12 of unemployment 0.24 0.08 0.26 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.12 
3 years before unemp.: Employed up to 1 month 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.11 
3 years before unemp.: Employed 1-6 months 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 
3 years before unemp.: Employed 7-12 months 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.10 
3 years before unemp.: Employed 13-18 months 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.16 
3 years before unemp.: Employed 19-24 months 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.17 
3 years before unemp.: Employed 25-30 months 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.14 0.21 
3 years before unemp.: Employed 30-36 months 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.26 0.11 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.11 0.21 
2 years before unemp.: Unemployed up to 1 month- 0.44 0.49 0.51 0.61 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.43 
2 years before unemp.: Unemployed 1-6 months 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.19 0.21 
2 years before unemp.: Unemployed 7-12 months 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.19 
2 years before unemp.: Unemployed 13-18 months 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.11 
2 years before unemp.: Unemployed 19-24 months 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.05 
2 years before unemp.: Participation in program 0.33 0.14 0.32 0.15 0.39 0.24 0.50 0.30 0.35 0.20 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.54 0.33 
2 years before unemp.: Periods of sickness 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.13 
v
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2 years before unemp.: Sanctioned 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
 Number of observations 3130 87119 1039 31201 3969 37639 1672 10866 953 2277 253 681 1274 2397 414 672 
*) Only program participations in short-firm internal training that took place more than one month before taking-up the job. 
Note:  Excepted local rates for the 3-digit-occupation, all variables are categorized as dummy variables. 
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Appendix B: Fiscal cost-benefit analysis of direct effects 
The following cost-benefit analysis has to be interpreted with care: On the one hand 
we compare workers taking up subsidized and unsubsidized jobs and thus implicitly 
assume that the subsidy was not necessary for hiring, which may underestimate the 
benefits of the subsidy. One the other hand we have to assume that the higher em-
ployment shares of previously subsidized workers are in fact a causal result of sub-
sidization, which may overestimate the benefits. Furthermore, the analysis does not 
take into account possible indirect effects like substitution and crowding-out of pre-
viously unsubsidized workers through previously subsidized workers. The latter ef-
fects do not necessarily have to occur; in the absence of subsidization subsequent 
mismatch might just have been larger. Hujer et al. (2009) found no evidence of posi-
tive effects of active labor market programs on regional outflows from unemploy-
ment in West Germany during 2003 and 2004; but our analysis indicates that an 
important feature of wage subsidies might be that inflows of previously subsidized 
individuals into unemployment are lower. 
Table B.1 
Fiscal cost-benefit analysis of subsidized work for the 3.5 year period since taking 
up the job (mean values) 
  Full sample  Only firms hiring subsidized and unsubsidized workers 
 West East  West East 
 Men Wo. Men Wo.  Men Wo. Men Wo. 
Duration of the subsidy in days 124 127 151 173   117 118 142 162
Daily rate of subsidization 20 20 16 17  20 19 16 17
A) Amount of the subsidy 2512 2536 2631 3124   2360 2258 2463 2906
Daily unemployment benefit/assistance 20 16 18 14   19 16 18 15
Additional days in employment 70 63 115 130  73 157 88 112
B) Savings in unemp. benefits/assistance 1381 995 2107 1810   1380 2514 1595 1627
Additional wage per day (1c) 3 2 4 3   3 8 4 3
Additional earnings over 3.5 years 3923 2199 4951 4175  3873 10352 5234 4012
C1) Additional social social sec.  and taxes 1962 1099 2476 2087   1936 5176 2617 2006
Additional wage difference per day (2c) 3 2 4 3  2 7 4 3
Additional income difference 4084 2993 4687 3480  3034 8604 4910 4438
C2) Additional social sec. and taxes 2042 1496 2344 1740   1517 4302 2455 2219
B+C1-A = Fiscal net effect based on 1c) 830 -442 1951 773  956 5432 1749 727
B+C2-A = Fiscal net effect based on 2c) 911 -45 1819 426   537 4558 1587 940
Note:  The analysis is based on the results from Table 2 and 3. Daily subsidy rates are estimated from cost 
accounting at the local level. Savings in unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance are com-
puted from individual daily rates received at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Social security 
contributions (employee and employer) and taxes are estimated to account for on average 50 percent of 
additional incomes. The fiscal net effect is given by: Savings in unemployment benefits and assistance 
+ additional social security contributions and taxes - amount of the subsidy. 
 
We estimate the direct fiscal net effect for previously subsidized workers by deduct-
ing the estimated amount of the subsidy from estimated savings in unemployment 
benefits and unemployment assistance as well as estimated additional social secu-
rity contribution and taxes during our observation period of 3.5 years (assuming an 
interest rate of zero). We do not have individual information on the size of the sub-
sidy, but information merged through cost accounting at the local level. Mean sav-
ings in unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance are computed from 
individual daily benefits at the beginning of the unemployment spell preceding the 
analyzed hiring. Fiscal savings and additional incomes are computed on the base of 
gains in mean daily wages (1c) and mean daily wage differences (2c) from Table 2 
and 3. Similar to Pfeiffer & Winterhager (2005), we assume that social security con-
tributions and taxes constitute on average 50 percent of additional earnings. We 
neglect administrative costs of handling the subsidy and administrative savings from 
less future contact with the local labor market offices. 
As a result, Table B.1 shows that – independent of the underlying estimates of sav-
ings and additional incomes – estimated fiscal gains amount to 1600 to 2000 Euros 
for men in East Germany and to 500 to 1000 Euros for men in West Germany and 
women in East Germany over the observation period of 3.5 years. Estimates vary, 
however, strongly for female workers in West Germany (where caseloads were low-
est), depending on the underlying specification. 
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